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Abstract 
Switzerland, with the forecasted electricity gap between domestic production and demand, 
aims to significantly increase renewable energy sources including hydropower. Mini 
hydropower (<1MW) currently has considerable unused technical potential. As a renewable 
energy source (RES) it can contribute to climate change mitigation. CO2-taxes or emission 
trading systems (ETS) for planned thermal power plants could help facilitate mini 
hydropower (MHP). The technology is mature, but requires adequate frameworks (e.g. 
regulation, streamlining of procedures, adequate financial mechanisms) to maximize its 
remaining potential under economically viable conditions. This paper analyzes the coherence 
between institutions and technologies in the case of MHP in Switzerland. It takes into 
account the current liberalization of the electricity market, the government’s goal to increase 
the weight of RES and the post-Kyoto context. The analysis aims to increase the degree of 
coherence between the institutions and the technology. As a result the overall performance of 
MHP will increase. The paper contains a dynamic perspective on the infrastructure and a 
conclusion with recommendations for further research on the development of adequate policy 
shaping institutional mechanisms to facilitate MHP in Switzerland – mechanisms that could 
be adapted to other countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Climate change and sustainable development are top priorities worldwide today. In 
Switzerland, alongside neighbouring countries, there will be an electricity gap between the 
domestic production and demand in the near (BFE, 2007; ECG, 2009). The Swiss 
government aims to increase the total amount of electricity produced by renewable energy 
sources (RES) between 2010 and 2020 from 16 to 24% (EnergieSchweiz, 2008, p. 6). One of 
the seven measures of this initiative is the facilitation of hydropower, including mini (0.1-1 
MW) and small (1-10 MW) hydropower (Steinmann, 2004). As mini and small hydropower 
technologies are well established this research provides an interesting case of institutions 
having to evolve and innovate in a coherent way with technology. 
The European electricity sector is presently undergoing a liberalisation process. The sector is 
supposed to function based on market-mechanisms, but in the current economic crisis 
institutional and regulatory interventions may become more important again. In addition, new 
investments are required within the sector and governments want to promote more RES 
infrastructure (“green new deal”). In Switzerland, there is large heterogeneity among the 
electricity production firms, most of them still belonging to public entities, such as 
communes and cantons. As the cantons and communes decide on the institutional framework 
as well, they are shareholders and institutional decision maker at the same time. 
Hydropower throughout the world provides 17% of the electricity from an installed capacity 
of some 720 GW, making hydropower by far the most important renewable energy source for 
electrical power production. In the EU-15, hydropower accounts for around 84% of 
electricity generated from renewable energy sources in 2006 (ESHA, 2006, p. 5). 
The depletion of oil and natural gas deposits will lead to higher generation costs for thermal 
plants, as well as CO2-taxes or cap and trade schemes. By offsetting thermal generation, mini 
and small hydropower can be leading technologies in efforts to reduce greenhouse gases and 
in climate change mitigation. The growth of the world’s population, especially in developing 
countries, will require the appropriate infrastructure for irrigation and water supply. The 
addition of a hydropower component to such a project is economic and has no major 
environmental or social impacts but a broad range of benefits through ensuring decentralized 
energy supplies. In addition, mini and small hydropower plants in developing countries can 
benefit from CO2-compensation mechanisms such as Clean Development Mechanisms 
(CDM) and Adaptation Funds (or similar mechanisms in a post-Kyoto context). 
The main advantages of mini hydropower (MHP) are: 
- It does not involve a process of combustion, therefore avoiding CO2 emissions, acid 
rains and smog; it is a clean resource; 
- The fuel is water, which is not consumed in the electricity generation process; it is a 
renewable resource; 
- MHP is available within the borders of one country and not subject to disruption by 
international political events, and because it is a domestic resource, it is not subject to 
market fluctuation like fuel or natural gas; it is a secure resource; 
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- It can satisfy energy demand with no depletion of the resource and with little impact 
on the environment; it is an efficient resource; 
- Usually, it does not require the creation of large lakes, thus avoiding sedimentation 
problems and the filling of the reservoir; it is a sustainable resource. 
 
The aim of this paper is to contribute towards the shaping of institutional frameworks in such 
a way that facilitates mini hydropower. The unit of analysis is Switzerland which is a country 
well known by the author, and which has remaining MHP potential. It is also a country with 
specific institutional perspectives. The conclusions of this paper will also be useful for mini 
hydropower in other part of the world. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a brief summary on the framework of 
coherence between institutions and technologies on which this paper is based. Section 3 
describes in general terms the MHP technology and the institutions around it within 
Switzerland. Section 4 analyses the coherence between the technology and institutions in the 
case of MHP in Switzerland. Section 5 provides concluding thoughts and recommendations 
for further research. 
2. Coherence between institutions and technologies 
MHP is part of the electricity network infrastructure. This infrastructure is technically, 
economically, politically and environmentally complex. As electricity is essential, all actors 
in the sector must ensure its continuous delivery within specific quality standards (e.g. 
reliability). 
The current liberalisation process of the electricity sector focuses on institutional changes, 
such as deregulation, reregulation, unbundling, introduction of competition at the production 
level and other measures related to the market structure. At the same time, governments want 
to increase the usage of RES for electricity production. In this context MHP can be seen as a 
mature and therefore very constant technology (see Section 3.2). Consequently the 
institutions should evolve in such a way that MHP is facilitated as a RES and its overall 
performance increased.  
The conceptual framework for the analysis within this paper is the literature on the co-
evolution between institutions and technology in the case of network industries (Finger, 
Groenewegen et al., 2005; Groenewegen, 2005; Hodgson, 2006; Künneke, 2008; Künneke, 
Groenewegen et al., 2008; Ménard, 2009). Figure 1 shows this framework: 
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Figure 1: The relationship between technology, institutions, coherence and performance 
(Finger, Groenewegen et al., 2005) 
According to the Oxford dictionary the definition of the term “technology” is the "scientific 
knowledge used in practical ways in industry”. Within this paper MHP represents the 
technology. 
North defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure 
incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic. Institutional change 
shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical 
change.” (North, 1990, p.3) 
The coherence between technology and institutions increases if both are aligned on a similar 
level for example organisational structure, coordination mechanisms et al. This paper will 
focus on this topic. 
The performance in this framework is defined through three parameters: the economic 
performance, the public value and the technical system integrity (Finger, Groenewegen et al., 
2005, Ch. 2.3). The economic performance concerns the static, dynamic and system 
efficiency. The public value is defined by the quality, accessibility, affordability and 
reliability of the service, as well as environmental aspects. Performance criteria of the 
technical system integrity are resilience and robustness. In the case of this paper, the focus is 
on the economic performance. 
In summary, it can be stated that the technology needs to be supported by suitable 
institutional frameworks in order to perform satisfactorily. 
3. Mini hydropower in Switzerland 
Mini hydropower plants combine the advantages of hydropower with those of decentralized 
power generation. There are no important environmental costs, no costly transport of 
electricity and no need for expensive maintenance. It is independent of imported fuels and 
increases the electrical grid stability. Most projects are not cost-efficient and require an 
adequate institutional framework to be implemented with contributions from the private 
sector. In developed countries, as well as in developing countries, MHP can be combined 
with other existing or planned infrastructures. 
Technology Institutions 
Degree of 
coherence 
Performance 
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3.1 Definition and history 
The definitions used in this paper correspond with International Energy Agency (IEA, 2003, 
p. 31) and World Bank definition, as well as with most of the Swiss and European 
regulations: 
- Mini hydropower (MHP):  100 – 1’000 kW or 0.1 – 1 MW 
- Small hydropower (SHP):  1 – 10 MW 
As SHP has similar issues around its coherence between the technology (it is a bigger scale of 
MHP) and institutions (which are similar to MHP), SHP is mentioned occasionally within 
this paper. Certain RES facilitation mechanisms concern MHP and SHP together. 
MHP and SHP have a long history. First hydraulic machines in China and the Mediterranean 
basin date from 200 B.C (Andaroodi, Schleiss et al., 2005, p. 20). The first hydroelectric 
scheme was installed in Wisconsin, USA in September 1882 only three years after Thomas 
Edison invented the light bulb. In the early 20th century, there were nearly 7’000 MHP and 
SHP plants in Switzerland of which more than 90% were rated below 300 kW and consisted 
of water wheels and mini turbines (Leutwiler, 2006). Table 1 highlights figures during the 
20th century when the number of operated MHP plants below 300 kW strongly decreased. 
History shows that MHP and SHP are mature technologies and received a lot of technical 
R&D in Switzerland during the past decades through government facilitation programs 
(PACER, DIANE) and research laboratories (e.g. MHyLab, EPFL-LCH). In 2008, MHP 
represented 2.2% of the Swiss hydropower production and 1.2% of the total electricity 
production (Table 1).  
Installed 
electrical 
capacity (kW) 
1947 1973 2008 
Plants MW Plants MW Plants MW 
GWh / 
year 
Total 
electricity 
production 
from 
hydro-
power 
Total 
electricity 
production 
Below  300 ~5'700 85 ~1'900 50 700 56 250 0.7% 0.4%
301 - 1'000 116 68 126 72 171 97 510 1.5% 0.8%
1'001 - 10'000 102 407 139 518 172 641 2'725 7.7% 4.2%
Above 10'000 65 2'300 163 10'040 167 12'538 31'744 90.1% 48.8%
Total till 
10'000 ~5'920 560 ~2'165 640 1'043 794 3'485 9.9% 5.4%
Total 
hydropower ~6'000 2'860 ~2'330 10'680 1'210 13'332 35'229 100.0% 54.2%
Table 1: MHP and SHP in Switzerland during the 20th century (Leutwiler and Dasen, 2008) 
 
3.2 Technology 
Hydro-turbines convert water pressure into mechanical power, which can be used to drive an 
electricity generator, or other machinery. The power available is proportional to the product 
of head and flow rate. The simplified formula for hydro system power output is: 
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Power (kW) = 8 × Q × H 
Where: 
• 8 takes into account the gravity acceleration g (9.81 m/s2) and the overall efficiency 
of the system (in average 80%) 
• Q is the volume flow rate passing through the turbine (m3/s), 
• H is the effective pressure head of water across the turbine (m). 
There are no different technological paradigms. The potential energy of water is transformed 
into electrical energy. There are, however, different MHP systems. Two main classifications 
are used. The first one is the connection to a network. MHP plants can be off-grid, mini-grid 
or grid connected. In the case of off-grid, electricity is produced for one, or a limited number 
of users. In a mini-grid (e.g. local grid) and grid-connected case the electricity is provided to 
numerous users. 
The second classification uses the head. High head MHP has a head of 100 m or more. Figure 
2 shows the main components of such a plant. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Main component of a high-head MHP plant (Andaroodi, Schleiss et al., 2005, p. 
22) 
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The water is diverted through a water intake in the river bank or bed (1). A settling basin (2) 
is placed after the intake structure to remove sand particles from the flowing water. Then a 
headrace canal (3) follows the contour of the hillside to provide the required head for energy 
production. After that the water enters a forebay (4) and passes into a closed pipe known as a 
penstock (5). This last structure is connected at a lower elevation to a turbine located in the 
power house (6). At the outlet of the turbine, the water is discharged to the river, via the 
tailrace. Medium head MHP are between 30 m and 100 m head. Low head MHP are below 
30 m. They are typically built in a wide and flat river valley.  
In developed countries, as well as in developing countries, MHP can be combined with other 
existing or planned infrastructures. These can be potable, runoff, irrigation and waste-water 
networks and installations using the residual flow at bigger hydropower plants (so called 
“Dotierkraftwerke” in German). The advantages are: 
- Use of existing or planned network infrastructure. No new networks needed. 
- No additional negative impacts on the environment. 
- Limited investment for a MHP setting. 
MHP has a high energy payback ratio. For each power generation system, the “energy 
payback” is the ratio of energy produced during its normal life span, divided by the energy 
required to build, maintain and fuel the generation equipment. If a system has a low payback 
ratio, much energy is required to build and maintain it and this energy is likely to produce 
major environmental impacts. Run-of-river hydropower has an energy payback ratio of 30 to 
267; biomass 3-27; wind power 5-39; solar photovoltaic 1-14 (ESHA, 2006, p. 6). The 
payback ratios do vary significantly for renewable energies. This is due to variable site 
conditions (e.g. topography in the case of hydropower, quality of the wind in case of wind 
power, intensity of solar radiation for solar power). 
Compared to other RES, MHP has lower production costs (including financial costs) at 10-25 
cts/kWh. Wind power has costs of 20 cts/kWh, biomass of 28-42 cts/kWh and solar of above 
60 cts/kWh (BFE, 2007, Fig. 3.2-3). Hydropower projects have a high initial investment 
followed by low operational costs.   
For plants with an installed capacity below 300 kW, standardized construction and 
standardized electromechanical equipment are possible. Plants above 300 kW require 
individual design specific to the geographical site. 
The last in-depth study of MHP potential in Switzerland was completed in 1987 (Desserich 
and Funk, 1987). The technical potential of MHP and SHP combined in Switzerland was 
evaluated at around 9‘000 GWh/a, when approximately 3‘000 GWh/a were used. In 
November 2008, the Swiss government initiated a new study on the evaluation of the 
remaining technical potential of MHP and SHP in Switzerland. The final results will be 
available in 2012. MHP still has considerable unused technical and ecological potential1.  
Newly designed MHP plants are well integrated environmentally and respect issues of the 
water intake, minimum instream flow (downstream of the water intake) and fish passes. The 
equipment is readily available and construction procedures are well known. On a worldwide 
                                                 
1 The definitions of different potentials are defined by the Swiss Federal Office for Energy (Piot 2006). 
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level, MHP is one way to enable people to have electricity to reach the Millennium 
Development Goals and to protect the environment whilst using a RES.  
3.3 Institutions 
A reason why most MHP projects are not economic profitable under the current framework 
conditions is that the external costs of energy production (e.g. pollution such as GHG 
emissions) are not internalised. MHP costs tend to be significantly higher than those of 
conventional sources of energy. The result is that electricity generated with renewable energy 
sources cannot compete on a free market with conventional generation and therefore some 
form of market incentive or support is required to develop the technology. Consequently, 
MHP electricity requires two essential elements for increasing development: (i) a stable 
regulatory framework to reduce uncertainty and attract investors, (ii) a price support 
mechanism that enables producers to enter the market and make a reasonable profit. The 
latter will be described as financial mechanisms hereafter. 
Financial mechanisms 
The following main existing financial mechanisms have been identified:  
Mechanism Explanation 
Feed-in tariff  
The Swiss feed-in tariff was introduced on the 01.01.2009. It 
is a cost-effective net metering  (Energy Law, 2009, Art. 7a). 
Before it was introduced MHP benefited from a guaranteed 
tariff of 15 cts/kWh. Now the tariff depends on the installed 
capacity, head and a bonus linked to the hydraulic 
construction. It varies between 5 - 39.5 cts/kWh. The tariff is 
guaranteed for 25 years and there are no ecological 
constraints to it. It cannot be combined with the green 
electricity market. 
The pool to fund the feed-in tariff is limited and its income is 
provided by 0.4-0.6 cts per consumed kWh. It is a consumer 
based mechanism and not a state subsidy. The pool has been 
quickly emptied resulting in a lack of financing for new 
MHP plants. The huge demand is a sign of the reality of the 
remaining MHP potential in Switzerland.  
Water rental 
This is a tax of 80 CHF/kW. It applies to SHP and ranges 
from 0 to 80 CHF/kW. MHP is exempt. (Plaz and Hanser, 
2008, p. 52) 
Labelling  
The sole existing label for MHP in Switzerland is 
“Naturemade” (http://www.naturemade.org). It is a Swiss 
label for green energy and recognized by ProNatura, WWF 
and Greenpeace, and can be used at a European level. A 
certified MHP plant can sell the ecological value of its 
electricity at an increased price. The price premium for the 
ecological value changes between 0.03 cts/kWh to 0.17 
cts/kWh (www.topten.ch May 2009). 
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The labelling costs for a new project are around CHF 
10’000. For projects using older infrastructures or existing 
projects which want to be certified the costs will be higher 
due to the need to improve the environmental integration of 
the plant. These costs are very high in relative terms for 
MHP projects.  
Hydropower projects which seek the label must fulfil the 
greenhydro standards (Bratrich and Truffer, 2001). 
Government subsidies 
Federal contributions to the pre-feasibility and feasibility 
studies for MHP range from 60% (5kW) to 30% (1MW) of 
the study costs.  www.smallhydro.ch.  
Mechanisms at canton 
level 
These are typical within a federalist country such as 
Switzerland, some cantons support MHP development 
independently. The canton of Bern supports plants with an 
installed capacity below 300 kW in the form of loans 
without interest and reductions of financial charges (Loi sur 
l’améngaement des eaux, LAE, 1989, Art.9).  
Table 2: Existing financial mechanisms related to MHP in Switzerland 
With these mechanisms there are three main revenue options for a MHP plant:  
A. Feed-in tariff 
B. Free market price + Labelling 
C. Free market price 
Regulatory framework and other mechanisms 
Firstly, there is technical regulation such as the minimum instream flow which needs to be 
guaranteed downstream of the water intake. This regulation is a national state level. 
Secondly, as mentioned above, the regulatory framework varies between cantons. Project 
phases are different, procedures with the authorities are different, and there are even 
differences between communes (Steinmann, 2004). Promoters of MHP projects are unable to 
standardise their procedures between cantons and have to build up their network and local 
knowledge for each new area they work in. This increases their transaction costs. The costs 
for the pre-feasibility study, feasibility study, project design and partnership building are 
higher for MHP than for larger hydropower in relation to the whole investment.  
Since 1991 the Swiss government has had ongoing facilitation programs for RES from 
which MHP has benefited (PACER, DIANE (Chenal, Vuillerat et al., 1995) (Hintermann, 
1994)). These will continue until 2020. The most recent is “EnergieSchweiz nach 2010” 
(EnergieSchweiz, 2008).  
At a national institutional level, quota for RES could be introduced (as prepared in the 
Energy Law (2009, Art. 7b)). This will be the case if the other mechanisms (e.g. feed-in 
tariff) are not enough to reach the governmental goals on RES facilitation and climate 
change.  
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Furthermore, in the post-Kyoto context, MHP could generate CO2-credits and become part 
of the Swiss Emission Trading System (ETS). The increase of electricity production from 
RES will not fill the coming electricity gap in Switzerland and electricity producers, 
alongside better energy efficiency and frugalness, will need to increase their production 
through the increased use of large power plants, including very likely combined cycle gas 
thermal plants (ECG, 2009). These plants are only politically and economically feasible if 
adequate ecological provisions, such as CO2-compensation, are taken into account.  
3.4 Strengths and weaknesses 
The main strengths of MHP in Switzerland are: 
- MHP is a mature technology with a very high efficiency (82-90%); 
- MHP is a renewable energy (no fossil fuel, no CO2-emissions); 
- the environmental impact is limited; 
- MHP can be integrated in multipurpose infrastructure. 
Whereas the main weaknesses of MHP in Switzerland are: 
- the electricity production significantly dependents on hydrology; 
- there are higher production costs (compared to conventional generation of electricity 
with thermal plants); 
- there is still considerable environmental opposition. 
Feed-in tariffs, labelling and CO2-credits could prove beneficial to MHP and the changes 
within the liberalisation of the electricity sector could also be an opportunity for MHP. 
However, there are also threats from climate change (disrupting water supply and modifying 
hydrology) as well as the attention (financial and political) given to other renewable energies 
such as solar and wind power. 
4. Analysis of the coherence between the institutions and the technology 
4.1 Liberalisation process within the electricity sector and economic performance 
The aim behind the liberalisation process is to increase the economic and systemic efficiency 
as well as the quality of the service. Due to this process, the institutional framework has 
changed from a public utility-oriented system towards a market-oriented system even though 
electricity is still seen as a public service. The technological side however has changed much 
less. In order to make the facilitation of RES within the liberalisation a success, some further 
institutional changes might be necessary. 
In the electricity sector the introduced competition is at the production, access and sale levels. 
Transport and distribution remain monopolies and are strictly regulated. MHP as RES has to 
compete at the production level with the other energy sources. The liberalisation process is 
pointing in the direction of the development of decentralized and small-scale power 
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production, which requires less investment and is perceived as being less risky (Künneke, 
2008, p. 235). MHP is one technology to assure such production.  
From an institutional perspective liberalisation leads to the unbundling of the vertically 
integrated electricity sector. The changes occur within level 2 and 3 of the four level model of 
Williamson (Figure 3). On the technological side, changes must happen on corresponding 
levels of Künneke’s model (Figure 4) to ensure the coherence in the electricity sector. MHP 
as a decentralized production alternative is aligned with the aim of increasing the degree of 
coherence and the overall performance of the electricity sector within the institutional 
changes of the liberalisation. 
Williamson’s model is based on different approaches in the field of social science 
(Williamson, 1998). It distinguishes four levels of analysis of institutions and is based on two 
main criteria: first, the level of analysis and second, the frequencies and purpose of change of 
institutions. Both of these criteria are qualitative and aim to highlight only some general 
differences.  
Künnecke developed a similar model from a technological perspective (Künneke, 2008). 
Technological paradigms are long-term waves of technological practices (e.g. currently ICT 
and biotechnology). Technological trajectories deal with the understanding of the features of 
specific technical systems that serve certain needs (Dosi, 1982). According to Nelson and 
Sampat the notion of “routine” refers to “a collection of procedures which, taken together, 
result in a predictable and specifiable outcome” (2001, p. 42). The “routines” deal with the 
optimization of scale and scope of a given technology. The last level of the model refers to 
the day-to-day management of systems components. 
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Figure 3: The four level model of Williamson (1998)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Figure 4: The four level model of Künnecke (2008) 
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In the case of MHP, it is not the technology which has to adapt so much but the institutions (again on 
level 2 and 3 of Williamson’s models). This in turn will increase the economic potential and thus the 
economic performance of MHP (Section 2). The economic, enlarged economic and “socio-
acceptance” potential of MHP is represented on the following figure.  
 
Figure 5: The different potentials (Piot, 2006) 
The theoretical potential of a given technology (in our case MHP) is represented by the main 
rectangle. Part of the theoretical potential is technically feasible, therefore leading to the technical 
potential (white rectangle). Within the technical potential 4 further potentials emerge. Circle A 
represents the economic potential in a given context. B is the enlarged economic potential (e.g. 
economic potential created by specific measures to facilitate the chosen technology). C is the 
ecological potential (e.g. what is ecological acceptable) and D is the “socio-acceptance” potential 
which is a more fluid concept. The overlapping of these 4 potentials within the technical potential 
lead to the usable potential (1, 2, 3 and 4) and finally to the expected potential (1 and 2). To increase 
the economic performance the aim is to increase potential A and B, as well as D. D includes 
institutional and political aspects, whereas A includes only economic mechanisms (e.g. CO2-tax for 
fossil energy which would increase the economic potential of MHP as RES). The increase of B 
includes specific economic mechanisms linked to MHP such as the feed-in tariff for RES. 
The conceptual framework of section 2 will lead to align changes between the technology and the 
institutions and thus increase the potential A, B and D. Therefore the overall performance of MHP 
will be increased. 
4.2 Increasing the degree of coherence by changing institutions 
Increasing the degree of coherence between institutions and technology in the case of MHP, and 
therefore increasing the MHP performance, leads to a closer look at the following mechanisms. The 
innovation aspect currently focuses more on institutions, even though the technology can develop 
       Theoretical potential 
Technical potential 
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further (e.g. increase the environmental integration, increase lifetime of turbine, better part-flow / 
variable speed turbines, …). The institutional framework must evolve further to facilitate the mature 
MHP technology. Overall, a more coherent approach from the institutional perspective is required 
(interlinking mechanisms, streamlining of facilitation, balance between hydropower and ecology, 
etc.) and institutions must be aligned with small-scale, decentralized and RES electricity production. 
Feed-in tariff 
The Swiss government wants to significantly increase the amount of RES within electricity 
production (see Section 1). In 2009 a feed-in tariff for renewable energies was introduced as a step 
towards the facilitation of RES. It has certain provisions lacking in the case of MHP (Leutwiler, 
2008). It is not well adapted to either low head schemes or continually maintained and rehabilitated 
plants. In addition, the administrative procedure costs, especially around the required certification, 
are, in relative terms, significant for MHP projects as they are small-scale projects. There is no 
longer any funding available for these feed-in tariffs (see Table 2) and new ways of financing it are 
required. It is also worth noting that if a MHP plant receives the feed-in tariff, it cannot receive 
additional revenue through labelling (see below). 
Solution statements: 
- Financing: The regulation of feed-in tariffs enables an increase in income of up to 0.6 cts per 
consumed kWh (currently 0.45 cts/kWh). Instead of increasing this amount, the feed-in tariff 
could also be funded through a CO2-tax perceived on fossil energy for electricity generation 
(e.g. planned gas plant in Switzerland) or fossil fuel. This would favour the introduction of 
more hybrids and electrical cars. The CO2-tax would encourage a move away from fossil fuel 
and facilitate RES for the electricity production required for these cars. 
- Adapt the feed-in tariff for well maintained and rehabilitated MHP plants and low-head 
schemes: The rehabilitation of existing plants should be encouraged even if the plants were 
only just financially viable before the introduction of the feed-in tariff. Further optimisation 
of these plants is favourable because the grey2 energy consumption and CO2-emissions are 
significantly reduced. Low head MHP schemes represent most of the remaining potential and 
their facilitation must be part of the design of the feed-in tariff. 
- Application quality: Many projects allocated to receive the feed-in tariff will never be built 
for ecological and local reasons. It is therefore important to allocate their tariff to feasible 
projects as soon as possible. A Swiss engineering office is currently developing a tool to help 
decision-makers to assess a project before granting it the feed-in tariff. 
- Application procedure: Procedural costs should be decreased in the case of MHP and other 
small-scale projects. This point is discussed below. 
An additional idea is introducing a modular tariff. This is a type of feed-in tariff which allocates a 
high financial value to the first kWh followed by decreasing financial values to the kWh produced 
afterwards. This offers more financial security due to the ability to better take into account the 
hydrological uncertainty of the overall production. 
Furthermore, the feed-in tariff could be adapted to promote production during peak hours. The 
government wants to guarantee the supply in electricity, even during peak demand periods. 
Hydropower can adapt very quickly and easily to an increase in electricity demand. The feed-in tariff 
could offer more remuneration for kWh produced during peak hours. This would enable additional 
                                                 
2 All the energy to produce a good (production, transport, storage).  
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investment in the design and construction of the plant to add the storage capacity and, if technically 
and ecologically feasible, the pump capacity as well. Another possibility would be an additional 
revenue for electricity production, available on the spot when needed, such as hydropower.  
Finally, the storage capacity of MHP and SHP could be used as balancing energy within the 
electricity grid. With the increasing amount of wind and solar power, whose energy production 
quantity cannot be predicted, additional capacities to balance the grid are required. SHP plants with 
storage facilities could fulfil such a role. Financial incentives for this could come from capacity 
payments3 or other capacity mechanisms instead of feed-in tariffs. 
Green electricity market 
Another mechanism to facilitate RES is the creation of a green electricity market which is not linked 
to the labelling mentioned below. If the feed-in tariff is unable to fund all remaining technically and 
ecologically feasible projects, other mechanisms need to be implemented. The actual trend within 
Europe is to move away from feed-in tariffs to price premiums based on market-mechanisms. A 
green electricity market could be at a national level and linked with other European countries. It 
would also contribute to high ecological standards. 
Solution statements:  
A green certificate actually represents the “greenness” of a unit of RES production. This 
divides the unit into two parts: the physical electricity and its associated “greenness”. These 
can be traded in two different markets: the conventional physical electricity markets and a 
market for the Tradable Green Certificates (TGC). Generated TGC with MHP could 
contribute to facilitate the technology. TGC could be traded with companies in countries 
where there is a required quota of RES production and when such companies do not fulfil 
their quota target. 
Labelling and greening 
A key issue around MHP is the balance between water protection and hydropower. Politically, the 
government and the cantons want to increase hydropower, but the ecological aspects need to be taken 
into consideration as well. Ecological NGO’s and environmental offices within administration take 
care of the latter. 
Solution statements:  
One solution statement is labelling. MHP plants only get an ecological label if they fulfil 
ecological standards. The existing label “Naturemade” for hydropower is unfortunately linked 
with very high transaction costs. In addition, the ecological standards might have to be 
slightly adapted for MHP plants as they are not simply a reduction in scale of large 
hydropower plants. If that is not possible, a new label could be introduced (maybe a quality 
label as described below). Labelling could be combined with greening of existing rivers. The 
revitalisation and renaturalisation of the river (up- or downstream) could balance out the 
benefit-damage assessment of a MHP plant. The additional revenue through selling labelled 
electricity to customers who want specifically hydropower or renewable energy would 
finance that process.  
“maxEnergy” 
                                                 
3 Capacity payments create revenues for all generating unties available at any time to contribute to an acceptable level of 
system reliability. 
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Today’s incentive mechanisms have an upper limit concerning the installed capacity (e.g. 1 or 10 
MW). This can lead to the design of smaller plants which receive incentives instead of designing one 
or several bigger plants which are technical and ecological the optimal solution for a given site. 
Solution statements: 
Introduce a quality label such as minEnergy for buildings (http://www.minergie.ch/). Called 
maxEnergy, it would be given to the plant with the optimal technical and ecological solution 
that uses the maximum available energy for a given head and flow, while respecting 
environmental constrains. It would be an incentive for the optimal environmental integration 
and in favour of a high load-factor. maxEnergy could be linked with feed-in tariffs or other 
financial mechanisms. 
Such as label could be used as a label for local production as well. Decentralized and local 
electricity generation increases the grid stability and decreases energy lost on transport of the 
energy. 
CO2-credits 
As stated in Section 3.3 it is very likely that combined gas thermal plants will be built in Switzerland 
to cover electricity demand. These plants will require adequate ecological provisions, such as CO2-
compensation. 
The current compensation scheme does not allow use of RES, except biomass, for CO2-
compensation (BAFU and BFE, 2008). But CO2-credits generated by other RES would make these 
RES technologies financially more interesting and contribute to increase the electricity amount from 
renewable and sustainable sources. New MHP and SHP plants could compensate 100% of a 400 MW 
gas thermal plant in Switzerland.  
Solution statements: 
As no thermal plant will be operational before 2013, it is important to wait for the 
Copenhagen conference in December 2009 to know more about the post-Kyoto framework.  
MHP and other RES could be facilitated by generating CO2-credits which could be traded on 
the national Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) or, if Switzerland joins the EU ETS, on the 
European trading scheme. This would contribute to a technological shift from fossil fuel to 
RES. One of the four main discussion points in Copenhagen is the technology transfer. MHP 
as a technology for developing countries could be facilitated by generating CO2-credits 
(currently under the Clean Development Mechanisms). Here again, transaction costs, mainly 
procedures costs, should be reduced by streamlining procedures. 
Instead of ETS, a CO2-tax on fossil fuel could be implemented. With its revenue, feed-in 
tariffs or other financial mechanisms could be financed. 
Water rental to tax resource 
The water rental is a tax on the installed capacity of a hydropower plant and not a tax on the actual 
amount of water used. 
Solution statements:  
17 
If the government wants to tax the use of water for producing electricity, it should put a tax 
on the water use and therefore the produced kWh (Plaz and Hanser, 2008, Ch. 4.4). Currently, 
the Swiss water rental is for plants with a capacity above 1 MW. To reflect real costs this 
should be applied to any hydropower plant (including an opposite pollution factor for thermal 
plants). 
Subsidies 
Certain external costs like GHG emissions are currently not taken into account in the electricity 
generation. If the involved institutions want to reflect the real price of electricity generation, 
additional mechanisms internalizing external costs need to be implemented such as a specific subsidy 
for RES. 
Solution statements:  
An overall cost-benefit analysis should be done taking into account the parameters of 
pollution, the grey energy and social impact such as local employment. This would show that 
MHP is competitive with other energy sources and based on this analysis the amount of 
required subsidy could be defined. The funding of the subsidy could come from a tax on 
pollution factors4 and grey energy factors. 
“No-use revenue” 
The environmental organisations are an important social power. They would like to maintain rivers 
in the natural state. At the same time, electricity production has to increase. More “in-between 
solutions” need to be found. 
Solution statements: 
The following ideas aim to give incentives to MHP to not-use or partly use the water resource 
in a technically feasible site.  
Firstly, design the MHP plant in a way that does not use the water resource in a technically 
optimal way allowing more water to be released downstream of the water intake than required 
by law. A bigger instream flow should receive an ecological label and therefore increase the 
revenue from labelled electricity. This would then compensate for the reduced production of 
kWh. 
The second idea is the no-use of a site. Instead of building a MHP plant at a technically 
feasible site, the river remains the same. The no-use of a site could be financed by the 
greening requirement of another site (see above). It should be integrated in a spatial planning 
approach of a region. For example, a valley keeps its river in a natural shape which is more 
attractive to tourists and can generate other revenues; the other valley uses its river to the 
fullest for hydropower production. Both valleys agree on a common partnership. This idea is 
based on the Swiss “landscape cents”5. The tourists would have a valley with a natural river 
and could consume RES electricity from the MHP plant in the neighbouring valley. 
Quota 
                                                 
4 A standard method to correct for an externality is to impose a (linear) tax at the rate of marginal external damages on 
the use of the entity responsible for the externality. 
5 http://www.parlament.ch/D/Suche/Seiten/geschaefte.aspx?gesch_id=20083699 (16.10.2009) 
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The Swiss energy law contains the possibility of the introduction of a quota for RES within 
electricity production (see Section 3.3). If other mechanisms do not lead to the set policy goals, such 
quota could be introduced from 2016. 
Solution statements: 
Introduce quota as complimentary to the other financial mechanisms. 
Investment pool 
In line with the facilitation of MHP and “green new deal” ideas, the access to capital has to be 
facilitated. Most Swiss banks are not currently interested in MHP projects as interest rates are too 
low. The facilitation of MHP does not only require mechanisms to generate enough revenue, but also 
the investment capital to fund it. 
Solution statements: 
The aim must be to increase the confidence of investors. This can be done by guaranteeing a 
stable institutional framework for MHP (see “streamlining of procedures”) and a stable 
situation over many years for the generation of the revenue (see points above). Once this is 
given, the facilitation of investment could be reached by creating an investment pool for 
MHP projects based on micro-credits principles – just with bigger amounts. The government 
could play the role of a facilitator by starting to invest in such a pool. If possible, such a pool 
could even try to become part of the national stock exchange. To a certain extend, local 
capital should also contribute to finance MHP projects increasing the local ownership. 
Standardisation and streamlining of procedures 
As mentioned above, the facilitation of MHP requires stable mechanisms in time and space. The time 
scale is provided by a stable institutional framework in the case of Switzerland. However, the 
stability from a space perspective is not provided as each canton has different laws, regulation, 
concession rights, financial incentives, offices, et al. concerning MHP. There can even be differences 
between communes within a canton. This makes the national facilitation of MHP and RES in general 
more complicated and is typical for a federal state such as Switzerland. 
Solution statements: 
A greater level of standardisation and streamlining of procedures would reduce transaction 
costs. This involves, for example, a harmonisation between canton regulations and project 
phases (e.g. merge application for concession and construction). It would reduce the 
procedural costs which are, in relative terms, significant for small-scale projects. The 
regulatory framework would therefore become more coherent nationwide. 
The number of actors and organisations for a MHP project should be as low as possible. The 
smaller the number of actors and organisations, the smaller are the transaction costs and 
potential communication misunderstandings. 
A further option to reduce transaction costs is to deal only with group projects (e.g. within the 
same riverine zone) and not with single projects. This would increase the regional grid 
stability as a certain minimum electricity generation could be guaranteed from a group of 
projects. If required, certain projects could include storage facilities to be able to contribute to 
the balancing energy for the network. 
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Another idea is to complete all administrative procedures in an online E-project with a single 
web interface. This could contain different sections including feed-in tariff application (state 
level), subsidies provided by public authorities (state level), concession rights (cantonal and 
commune level), etc. Each canton could have its own website whilst still using the same user 
interface as the other cantons. The different institutions in each canton could be assigned to 
the corresponding sections and the website used for monitoring and controlling as well. 
Lastly, the certification procedure for TGC, labels or CO2-credits could be included within 
this E-project. As a result, MHP procedure would be unified and transaction costs 
significantly reduced. 
Minimum instream flow 
The law requires a minimum instream flow downstream of the water intake for environmental 
reasons (Gewässerschutzgesetz, Bundesversammlung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, 1991, 
Art 31). At present it is a constant value, but could be adapted to increase electricity production 
revenue and still be environmentally sensitive. 
Solution statements: 
Use a dynamic minimum instream flow with fluctuation on a daily and / or seasonal basis. 
A seasonal dynamic would take into account certain periods of the year when more water 
should be released into the stream, and during other months this water could be used for 
power generation. 
Daily dynamic could be linked with producing energy for peak demand periods. More water 
would be released into the river to compensate for more electricity production during peak 
hours which results in generating the same revenue (less kWh produced, but sold for a higher 
price). 
 
The above mechanisms are often interlinked. Therefore a multi-criteria approach is required between 
the economic, political, environmental and technical aspects. The institutional actors behind each 
mechanism are the following. 
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Institutional actor Mechanisms 
State (national government and parliament) - Feed-in tariff 
- Tradable green certificates 
- CO2-credits 
- Subsidies 
- Quota 
- Standardisation and streamlining of 
procedures 
- Minimum instream flow 
Cantons (cantonal government and 
parliament) 
- Subsidies 
- Standardisation and streamlining of 
procedures 
Communes - Standardisation and streamlining of 
procedures 
Private sector at national level - Labelling 
- “maxEnergy” label 
- “no-use” revenue 
- Investment pool 
Table 3: Institutional actors behind the mechanisms 
The next table summarises the mechanisms that exclude each other or that can be interlinked. The 
most likely mechanisms to change or to be adapted are: feed-in tariff, labelling / “maxEnergy” label, 
CO2-credits, subsidies, and standardisation and streamlining of procedures. The overall aim is to 
develop a more coherent overall approach towards these mechanisms to facilitate MHP from an 
institutional perspective. 
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Table 4: Overview of mechanisms in Switzerland: mechanisms excluding each other (red) and 
interlinked mechanisms (yellow) 
4.3 Infrastructure dynamics and regulation 
This paper has discussed a current view of the coherence between institutions and technology in the 
case of MHP. It has been shown that changes and innovation have to occur mainly at the institutional 
level. A dynamic view includes discussions on the maintenance and increase of the degree of 
coherence over time.  
The implicit objective of regulatory economics (i.e. static efficiency, consumer protection) conflicts 
often with other objectives such as dynamic systemic efficiency, social and political objectives 
(public service, security of supply), and technical objectives (resilience, robustness) (Finger, 2009). It 
is therefore important to have a multi-criteria approach, not only economic, to the different 
mechanisms and institutional changes. 
From an economic regulation perspective, the markets need to be sustained and not simply created 
(e.g. market for RES in the case of MHP). The political regulation must deal with the universal 
service regulation (consumer protection) and the security of supply. In the case of MHP the whole 
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electricity regulation must guarantee that the domestic electricity demand can be covered either by 
domestic production or imported electricity. The technical regulation concerns the aspects of 
interoperability, interconnection, safety, capacity management and system management (Finger, 
2009). In the case of MHP the two latter are of importance. MHP has to contribute to the required 
domestic production and contribute to the grid stability which is the case as decentralized production 
units. The infrastructure dynamic within the electricity sector could lead to even more decentralized 
production wherever technically and ecologically feasible, leading to many independent plants, or to 
a more centralized approach where several plants are bundled together to form a group (sometimes 
refer as “virtual plant”). The group interacts then with the network. 
Using the following model of Finger (2009), the infrastructure dynamic of the electricity sector from 
a technology perspective went from an integrated system through the unbundling to a distributed 
system. MHP is an example of distributed and decentralized production. The question arises if for 
coherence matters the institutions have to move even more into the direction of governance and 
decentralized decision-making in the MHP case (move in the same direction as technology), or if 
certain institutional mechanisms need to be at a centralized and governmental level (move in the 
opposite direction). The latter would lead to a decrease in the coherence within the framework of 
Figure 1. There may be cases where more incoherence actually increases the performance of the 
system. This will be subject of further research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Conceptualizing infrastructure dynamics (Finger, 2009): mini hydropower 
5. Conclusion and recommendations for further research 
The MHP technology is renewable, small-scale, decentralized and mature, and requires adequate 
institutional frameworks to maximize its remaining potential under economically viable conditions. 
Taking into account the current liberalisation of the electricity market, the government’s goal to 
increase the weight of renewable energy sources and the post-Kyoto context, further evolution of the 
institutions is needed. This can lead to adapted or new institutional mechanisms as described in 
 
 
Mini hydropower 
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Section 4.2. The degree of coherence between institutions and the technology has very likely to 
increase and as a result the economical performance of MHP will increase. 
MHP still has considerable unused technical potential. The current key issues around its facilitation 
are focused on financing MHP and the right balance between hydropower and environmental 
protection, as well as reducing the transaction costs linked to procedures, which are, in relative terms, 
significant for small scale projects. This involves, for example, a harmonisation between cantons and 
project phases in the Swiss case. The environmental considerations can be linked to the greening of 
rivers combined with MHP development. CO2-compensation for planned thermal power plants, in 
the form of CO2-taxes or emission trading systems (ETS), could become a mechanism to partly 
finance MHP. Compared to other RES, MHP should be developed at least as long as the production 
costs are lower than other RES. MHP has a higher energy payback ratio than other RES (see Section 
3.2) and should therefore be pushed even more within the facilitation of RES. 
As the electricity sector in its entirety has many complementarities between the technology and 
economic, political, environmental and societal aspects, the research on the degree of coherence 
between institutions and the technology must be a multi-criteria approach. Further research will need 
to focus on the infrastructure dynamics to assess if institutions need to become even more 
decentralized and on the governance level, or more centralized and on the government level. This 
includes research on further development of the conceptual framework to make it more quantitative 
allowing it to be used to measure and compare institutions and technology, and therefore able to 
quantify the optimal level of coherence. This will lead to recommendations for infrastructure policy 
around MHP. 
Further research will also have to continue to focus on the development of facilitation mechanisms. 
Such mechanisms can be “command & control” ones (e.g. standards, quotas), marked-based (e.g. 
feed-in tariff, taxes, tradable permits) or others (e.g. labelling). The mechanisms must be cost-
effective, transparent and support the dynamic efficiency. In addition, the regulatory framework 
needs to be studied more in depth for generating recommendations on the standardization and 
streamlining of procedures. Based on the outcomes concerning the mechanisms and procedures, 
recommendations could be given concerning which institutions and concrete organisation need to 
evolve and innovate. 
The aim of further research will be to continue to develop policy shaping institutional mechanisms 
(including financial mechanism) to facilitate mini hydropower in Switzerland – mechanisms that 
could be adapted to other countries. The overall objective is to increase the amount of electricity 
produced by MHP by changing the institutional framework.  
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